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Different ‘Boko Haram’ factions display contrasting militant
strategies to achieve their goals. While the original faction
Jama’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihad (JASDJ) is one of
the world’s most violent militant movements towards civilians, a
breakaway faction, Islamic State West Africa Province, mixes
extreme violence with efforts to win over local Muslim
populations. This approach demonstrates surprising parallels
with Cold War-era communist models of revolutionary warfare.
When one thinks of the places that jihadists look for inspiration, Cold
War-era communist strategists of insurgent warfare, such as Mao Tse-
Tung or Che Guevara, do not necessarily spring to mind. However,
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jihadist groups are in practice often very pragmatic on matters of
strategy and more than happy to learn from and adapt non-Islamic
sources of military thinking.
Academics have identi ed the links between revolutionary warfare as
advanced by Cold War-era communists and contemporary jihadists,
such as the Islamic State (IS). These links can be seen foremost in the
works of in uential jihadi strategists such as Abu ‘Ubeid Al-Qurashi, Abu
Mu’sab al-Suri, Abu Bakr Naji and Abd Al-Aziz al-Muqrin, who have all
advocated models of revolutionary insurgency that re ect adapted
forms of Maoist guerrilla practice, especially Mao’s three stages of
insurgency and the need to win over populations to the cause. These
models are suggested as a template for the establishment of control of
territory and the establishment of extremist Islamist political orders.
These ideas have also been translated more directly into jihadi theory.
The Islamic State’s  rst edition of its Dabiq magazine highlighted a
model for the establishment of an ‘Islamic State’ that closely mirrors the
work of Abu Bakr Naji, who was in uenced by Maoist military thinking.
This revolutionary warfare lens has, however, been applied less to
groups outside of the al Qaeda and Islamic State ‘cores’ and has not
been used to compare the two main, often competing, factions of the
wider ‘Boko Haram’ movement. In a recent article for African Security I
examined the public statements and politico-military actions of both
major ‘Boko Haram’ factions and compared them to the wider historical
practice of revolutionary warfare. The objective was not to prove an
exact overlap between Cold War-style revolutionary war and the
factions of Boko Haram, but rather to use this framework to examine
differences in the politico-military character of these factions.
What is revolutionary warfare?
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While there is no one single de nition of ‘revolutionary warfare’, most
discussions of the term rest on three elements (echoing those
advocated by Mao): 1) a revolutionary ideology that requires the seizure
of territory in order to establish a new socio-political order; 2) a strategy
for the development of popular support for a violent approach to
achieving this objective; and 3) a military strategy that sees a phased
escalation from rural guerrilla actions to conventional military activity to
control territory. The development of popular support is essential to the
model. Indeed, developing popular support both provides opportunities
for the promotion of revolutionary ideology and provides material
support and recruits for the phased escalation of the insurgency.
In 2015, the Boko Haram group (JASDJ) was listed as the world’s most
deadly terrorist organisation, with the group killing more people in 2014
than the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Under leader Abubakar Shekau,
JASDJ remains an extraordinarily brutal organisation targeting both the
Nigerian security forces and Nigerian citizens, including Muslims. While
focused on Nigeria predominantly, they have also attacked
communities in other countries in the Lake Chad Region. Numerous
documented attacks describe raids by JASDJ on population centres,
with men, women and children killed indiscriminately and whole
swathes of towns razed to the ground. The most infamous example is
probably the attack on the Nigerian town of Baga in 2015. The group is
also notorious for its treatment of women, seen in both the well-
publicised kidnapping of the Chibok Girls and its use of young women
and girls as suicide bombers.
The group justi es its violent approach through an extreme ‘tak rist’
position, which essentially declares anyone who does not seek to join
their group to be ‘tak r’ – an apostate who in their view can legitimately
be killed. This violence is not solely motivated by doctrine, however.
Violence also coerces civilians to join their group, evidenced by threats
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made to some communities [warning – graphic content] who decided
not to join JASDJ before they were attacked.
It has also been suggested that attacks on civilians push security
forces to spread themselves thinly, making them easier targets and in
turn reducing military pressure on the group. While JASDJ is certainly a
revolutionary group with revolutionary goals, this mixture of tak rist
doctrine and strategic practice precludes a Maoist-style revolutionary
warfare approach as it hinders the development of popular support (a
point also noted recently by Alkali Omeni).
Since its split with JASDJ in 2016, Islamic State West Africa Province
(ISWAP) has taken a quite different approach more in line with
population-centric revolutionary warfare practice. In so doing, it has
arguably created a more sustainable and potent insurgency. Former
ISWAP leader Abu Musab al Barnawi was very public in his criticism of
JASDJ’s attacks on Muslim civilians, arguing in public statements for a
more moderate position on questions of tak r. Unlike JASDJ’s targeting
of both Muslim civilians and the military, ISWAP has focused largely on
the latter, ramping up its attacks against security forces since mid-2018
in a pattern of escalating insurgency.
ISWAP has sought not only to avoid targeting Muslim civilians but to
actively win them over, opening markets, promoting commerce and
farming and providing rudimentary security. In return the group taxes
citizens and business, raising revenue and binding citizens into their
form of rule. In so doing, they are potentially creating a more
sustainable base for insurgency. Despite Abu Musab al Barnawi being
replaced by Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi in early 2019, the new
leadership does not appear to have radically changed the strategy.
This strategy also more effectively capitalises on mistakes made by the
Nigerian armed forces than the JASDJ approach. Cruelty or atrocities
committed by security forces compound the strength of the alternative
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presented by ISWAP. Likewise, the military’s closure of some markets
may be counterproductive in that they deprive local populations of their
livelihoods (unlike ISWAP who encourage such activity within limits).
Crucially, I am not suggesting that ISWAP are the ‘good’ jihadists or that
they are moderates – they certainly are not. They remain a brutal,
extremist organisation both to the non-Muslims they capture and
towards Muslims who have crossed them (not to mention the military).
They also appear to be increasing their targeting of Christians,
demonstrating a vicious sectarianism long-present within the wider
Boko Haram movement. They are, however, more selective, and
arguably more strategic than JASDJ, in terms of the targeting of their
violence.
This analysis shows that the ISWAP faction demonstrates a military
strategy and a use of force that appears far more in line with the
practice of revolutionary warfare than JASDJ. In so doing it re ects a
position that is closer to the forms of strategy advocated by Cold War
communist insurgents, such as Che Guevara and Mao, and shows
similarities with the strategy advocated by Naji and other jihadist
strategists. The JASDJ faction under Shekau, by contrast, has shown
the capability to seize signi cant territory in the past but with a military
approach that remains heavily focused on civilian attacks. This
approach is based almost exclusively on coercion (rather than the mix
of coercion and co-optation seen in ISWAP’s tactics) and thus largely
rules out a politically-based popular support strategy consistent with
revolutionary warfare practice.
Looking beyond ‘Boko Haram’, a key  nding of this study – that even
two factions originating from the same jihadist movement conduct
insurgency quite differently – highlights the variation in jihadist
strategic practice. While jihadist strategists and both Islamic State and
al-Qaeda have proffered strategic views based on quasi-Maoist
principles, further comparative research into the extent to which forms
21/02/2020 Boko Haram faction shows parallels with Cold War-era revolutionary insurgents | Africa at LSE
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2020/01/23/boko-haram-nigeria-cold-war-revolutionary-warfare/ 6/8
of revolutionary warfare are practiced by ‘a liates’ and Islamic State
‘provinces’ would further our understanding of the strategic
commonalities and differences between jihadist groups.
Photo: Nigerien soldiers practice vehicle contact movements in a
special forces training exercise designed to strengthen the ability to
counter violent extremist organisations. ‘Flintlock 2018 Training in
Agadez, Niger’ by Richard Bumgardner is licensed under creative
commons (CC BY 2.0).
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